Jennifer Chang, China Research Analyst, Exovera
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As a U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has become a key target of Chinese military diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Following the 2006 and 2014 military coups in Thailand, the United States temporarily cut back on defense ties with Bangkok until civilian rule was restored, providing China a strategic opening to expand security cooperation with the sole U.S. ally in mainland Southeast Asia. Since 2015 China has made significant in-roads into Thailand in terms of bolstering joint military exercises and arms exports including a landmark submarine deal. Although civilian rule has been restored in Thailand, Bangkok continues to deepen security cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as part of its hedging strategy against potential deterioration in U.S. defense ties.
- China’s main security cooperation programs with Thailand consist of joint military exercises and arms sales.
- China has become the largest exporter of arms to Thailand, which ranks as the third-largest recipient of Chinese arms exports after Pakistan and Bangladesh.
- Progress on a Chinese-made submarine for Thailand would constitute a breakthrough for Chinese military technology and a diplomatic win for Beijing amid the broader U.S.-China competition in Southeast Asia.
In February 2025, China and Thailand issued a joint statement on advancing their “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” reiterating their commitment to enhancing traditional and non-traditional security cooperation, including military-to-military exchanges at various levels, joint military exercises and training, cooperation in the defense industry, capacity building, personnel training, and technology transfer.
Media Highlight: “Friendship Across the Oceans—Observations on the China-Thailand ‘Blue Strike-2025’ Naval Joint Training”
According to Xinhua News Agency, the “Blue Strike-2025” (蓝色突击-2025) joint naval training has developed into an institutionalized cooperation mechanism for the Chinese and Thai navies. In late March to early April 2025, China and Thailand held the sixth iteration of “Blue Strike-2025” in Zhanjiang, a port city in southern Guangdong Province. Since the first China-Thailand “Blue Strike-2025” series of joint naval training was held in 2010, the scale and level of joint training has continuously improved and with increasingly richer content. The Chinese and Thai navies participated in joint maritime strike exercises, search and rescue, and replenishment at sea. A member of the Chinese naval fleet’s command center who participated in the joint maritime training said China and Thailand have achieved new results in tactical integration, information exchange, and joint command, and have formed a standardized joint exercise command process. In addition, significant progress has been made in the emergency and rapid response capabilities and cooperation between the two navies. Through bilateral naval cooperation such as “Blue Strike-2025,” China and Thailand are working together to maintain regional peace and stability, stated Xinhua.
Media Highlight: “Thailand’s Two Chinese-made Frigates ‘Return Home’: China-Thailand Naval Cooperation Creates a New Beginning”
On March 27, two Chinese-made frigates of the Royal Thai Navy—the Naresuan-class frigate and HTMS Bangpakong—returned to China to participate in joint training exercises organized by the People’s Liberation Army, underscoring the deepening of naval cooperation between China and Thailand. The two frigates dispatched by the Royal Thai Navy are modified versions of the Chinese-made Type 053 and Type 053H2 frigates. The Naresuan-class frigate, one of the core forces of the Royal Thai Navy, was put into service in 1995, while the HTMS Bangpakong constitutes the second ship of the Chao Praya-class frigate of the Thai Navy. Both frigates employ Chinese-made weapons and equipment, including anti-ship missiles, radar systems, and navigation equipment. For example, the Naresuan is equipped with advanced C-801 anti-ship missiles, which have demonstrated excellent strike capability.
According to the article, the Royal Thai Navy has shown a “high degree of trust” in procuring Chinese military equipment. For example, Thailand had planned to purchase S26T submarines made in China and decided to use the submarine budget to purchase frigates to further enhance its maritime combat capabilities. Thailand has also imported several patrol ships and warships from China, demonstrating the in-depth security cooperation between the two countries. In the future, as cooperation between the two sides continues to deepen, the Chinese and Thai navies will engage in more extensive cooperation in more areas and jointly contribute to regional security and stability, stated the article.
Exovera Commentary:
Thailand has two main security partners: the United States, its ally, and China, its largest trading partner and largest source of foreign investment. Following military coups in 2006 and 2014, Thailand increasingly tilted toward China on the military and security front. In response to the junta’s seizure of power in Thailand, the U.S. suspended most military assistance to Bangkok and reduced the number of joint military exercises, prioritizing democracy and human rights. By contrast, China did not impose such political conditions and thus became an attractive security partner for Thai military regimes that faced U.S. sanctions and arms export restrictions.
Major breakthroughs in Sino-Thai military cooperation have occurred during periods of military governance in Thailand, laying the foundation for sustained bilateral military engagement even after the return of civilian rule in 2019. In 2007, Thailand and China held their inaugural military exercise. Since 2015, China and Thailand have been conducting annual air force exercises, with a two-year break during the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the past decade, China and Thailand have broadened the scale and scope of joint military exercises. The PLA has held joint training drills with Thailand’s army, air force, and navy, including the “Strike” (突击)-series joint army training, “Eagle Strike” (鹰击)-series joint air force training, and “Blue Strike”-series joint naval training. Amid a deterioration in U.S.-Thai defense relations, Bangkok turned to China for military aid, military and security training, and professional military education for Thai soldiers.
The Thai junta’s tilt towards China in 2015 accelerated Chinese arms exports to Thailand. China’s arms exports to Thailand increased five-fold between 2014 and 2018 compared with the preceding five years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). China also became the largest exporter of arms to Thailand from 2019 to 2023, contributing 44 percent of its major weapons imports, said SIPRI. According to SIPRI’s database, Chinese arms transfers to Thailand since 2021 have included armored vehicles, such as 60 tanks, 26 armored personnel carriers, seven armored recovery vehicles, three light tanks, and three infantry fighting vehicles; 100 surface-to-air missiles; one surface-to-air system; and one amphibious assault ship. A 2024 report by SIPRI found that Thailand ranked as China’s third-largest arms recipient, after Pakistan and Bangladesh, constituting six percent of China’s total arms exports.
In a landmark deal struck under the Thai junta, Bangkok agreed to purchase a S26T Yuan-class conventionally powered submarine from China. Initially expected to be delivered in 2023, the production of the Chinese submarine has been stalled since 2022 after China failed to obtain German-made MTU 396 diesel engines due to the European Union’s arms embargo on China. In response, China has suggested installing Chinese engines in the submarine. Although initially rejected by the Royal Thai Navy, the proposal was later accepted. However, in a series of twists and turns, Thailand’s changing governments have gone back and forth on the issue of procuring the Chinese submarine, even suggesting that Bangkok might purchase a frigate from China instead of a submarine. The submarine fiasco has not yet been resolved, pending decisions by the Thai government on the engine issue. If the submarine deal can salvaged through artful negotiations, this could pave the way for sustained growth in Chinese weapons procurement, which could in turn lead to a fundamental change in Thailand’s arsenal from predominantly U.S.-sourced military hardware to mostly Chinese-made hardware over the long run.
More importantly, changes in Thailand’s domestic politics, particularly the country’s continuous shifts between unstable civilian governments and military rule, are a key determinant of Thailand’s relationships with both the U.S. and China. Any future military takeover in Thailand, a coup-prone country, would most likely result in suspension of U.S. military aid and subsequently facilitate the acceleration of Sino-Thai defense cooperation, thereby enhancing Bangkok’s reliance on China as a hedging strategy. Meanwhile, China is likely to continue promoting security cooperation with Thailand as a means for improving state-to-state relations and enhancing its influence in the Southeast Asian geopolitical battleground.
